US Tariffs Push Canada Toward China, Raising Security Fears
Canada is facing its most difficult strategic choice in decades. Squeezed by an increasingly hostile trade policy in Washington, Ottawa has opened the door wider to China than any other G7 government, while its own intelligence community keeps warning about the security and economic risks that come with Chinese capital and technology. As of November 16, 2026, the country is effectively trying to reduce its dependence on one superpower without becoming dependent on the other, and its automotive sector, symbolized by the idle Stellantis assembly plant in Brampton, Ontario, sits at the center of that balancing act.
The shift is all the more striking because Prime Minister Mark Carney described China as Canada's biggest security threat during the 2025 federal election campaign. Since then, his government has moved quickly in the opposite direction. Carney met Chinese President Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the APEC summit in South Korea in October 2025, the first formal leader-level talks between the two countries since 2017, and both sides described that meeting as a turning point in the relationship.
The January 2026 Beijing agreements
Carney then traveled to Beijing in January 2026, the first visit by a Canadian prime minister since 2017. On January 15, Natural Resources Minister Tim Hodgson signed a non-binding energy memorandum of understanding that calls for closer cooperation on crude oil, liquefied natural gas, liquefied petroleum gas, natural uranium trade and clean technology. Ottawa also signaled that it would welcome Chinese investment in energy, agriculture and consumer goods. On January 16, after meeting Xi at the Great Hall of the People, Carney announced what he called a strategic partnership.
The centerpiece was a tariff swap. Canada agreed to admit up to 49,000 Chinese-built electric vehicles per year at the most-favored-nation rate of 6.1%, replacing the 100% surtax imposed in October 2024 in step with the United States. The quota is set to grow to roughly 70,000 vehicles over five years. In return, China agreed to cut its combined duty on Canadian canola seed from about 84% to roughly 15% and to suspend punitive tariffs on canola meal, peas, lobster and crab until the end of 2026. Washington reacted sharply, with US officials warning that Canada would regret the decision and making clear that Chinese-brand vehicles would not be allowed to reach the American market through Canada.
What has changed on the ground since then
The agricultural side of the deal took effect on March 1, 2026, when China lowered its anti-dumping duty on Canadian canola seed to 5.9%, bringing the total effective rate to 14.9%. Canola shipments to China rebounded quickly, reaching 369,000 tonnes in March, the highest monthly level in almost a year. Beijing also reopened its market to beef from 20 registered Canadian meat plants. However, the relief on canola meal and peas is only guaranteed through December 31, 2026, which leaves Prairie farmers exposed to a renewed squeeze in a few weeks if the arrangement is not extended.
On the automotive side, Global Affairs Canada opened the import permit process on March 1, 2026, with a first tranche of 24,500 vehicles available until August 31 and a second tranche of the same size afterward. Geely delivered the first Chinese-built EVs under the new regime in May with a small shipment of Lotus Eletre SUVs, while Tesla relaunched a China-built Model 3 in Canada. BYD, Chery and Geely have since been building dealer networks and hiring staff in Toronto. Geely's main brand confirmed its Canadian entry on October 9, 2026, with first models planned for 2027, and Chery said on October 23 that it is studying local production by taking over idle capacity or building a plant with Canadian partners, arguing that Canada is worth manufacturing in even without access to the US market.
Brampton, the idle plant at the heart of the debate
The Stellantis Brampton Assembly Plant, where Dodge once built the Charger and Challenger, has been idle since December 2023. Stellantis had planned to retool it for the next-generation Jeep Compass but moved that program to Belvidere, Illinois, in response to US tariffs, leaving about 3,000 workers without a clear future. In April 2026, Stellantis explored assembling vehicles from its Chinese partner Leapmotor at the site, but Industry Minister Melanie Joly rejected a plan based on kits shipped from China, insisting that the plant must support the local supply chain. On September 1, Brampton Mayor Patrick Brown revealed that BYD, Leapmotor, an Italian automaker and two Canadian defense companies had all inquired about the facility.
The Brampton case illustrates the dilemma perfectly. A Chinese-backed project could bring back jobs and capital that Detroit automakers have pulled south, but it could also deepen Canada's reliance on Chinese batteries, software and components, and further antagonize Washington, which still buys the overwhelming majority of Canadian-built vehicles. Ottawa has tried to square the circle by asking Chinese automakers for Canadian-controlled joint ventures, local sourcing commitments and rules on data, conditions that Joly pressed during a visit to BYD, Chery and Geely facilities in China in June 2026.
Security warnings keep growing
The opening to Chinese vehicles has triggered persistent warnings from security experts. Ontario Premier Doug Ford has called Chinese EVs spy vehicles and urged Canadians to boycott them. In March 2026, experts urged Ottawa to follow Poland and Israel in banning Chinese-built cars from military bases. A Public Safety Canada memo released on June 1 acknowledged that connected vehicle data can have intelligence value for adversaries and noted that Chinese national security laws can compel manufacturers to share data with Beijing. In September, former Canadian Security Intelligence Service director David Vigneault warned that Chinese EVs could allow Beijing to gather extensive personal data on Canadians. Critics also point out that Canada, unlike the United States, has not yet published a formal screening process for connected vehicle software and data.
The American pressure that pushed Ottawa East
Carney's pivot cannot be separated from the deterioration of relations with Washington. Beyond repeated annexation rhetoric from President Donald Trump, the United States declined on July 1, 2026, to extend the Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement (CUSMA) in its current form, which pushed the pact into a cycle of annual reviews. On July 20, Trump signed three proclamations under Section 338 of the Tariff Act of 1930 imposing 50% duties on about US$20 billion of Canadian goods, including motor vehicles, dairy, alcoholic beverages, chemicals, plastics and machinery, with no exemption for CUSMA-compliant products.
A last-minute deal briefly appeared within reach on August 18, but Carney suspended negotiations on August 21, saying Washington was demanding limits on Canada's ability to sign trade deals with third countries. The Section 338 duties took effect at 00:01 ET on August 22, and Canada responded with retaliatory surtaxes of 15%, 25% or 50% on 648 US products worth about C$27.6 billion, in force since 00:01 ET on September 8. Ottawa also announced a C$7.5 billion support package for affected workers and firms. Existing Section 232 tariffs on steel, aluminum, copper and autos remain in place on top of these measures.
Talks have since resumed. In early November, Carney said the United States had dropped its demands on culture and on third-country agreements, and US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer confirmed on November 12 that officials had been in contact without setting any deadline. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said on November 13 that he was optimistic about deals with Canada and Mexico, but no terms have been disclosed. Carney has said he will not accept an agreement that leaves Canada without a viable auto sector.
Diversification, the third way
Despite the turmoil, the United States still absorbed 71.7% of Canadian merchandise exports in 2025, down from 75.9% in 2024, and that share climbed back above 70% in September 2026, when exports to the US totaled C$55.2 billion in a single month. To reduce this exposure without leaning too heavily on Beijing, Carney has pledged to double non-US exports by 2035. On November 16, in Manila, Canada concluded free trade talks with the Philippines and substantially concluded negotiations with the ASEAN bloc, adding to recent agreements with Indonesia, Ecuador and the United Arab Emirates.
What comes next
The next test is imminent. Carney is traveling to Shenzhen for the APEC leaders' meeting on November 18 and 19 and is scheduled to meet Xi late on Monday evening, Ottawa time. Chinese investment in the Canadian auto sector, agriculture, energy and financial services is expected to dominate the talks, while Trump and Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum are also expected at the summit. For supply chain managers, the key questions are whether Canada will approve a Chinese-backed vehicle plant such as a revived Brampton facility, whether China will extend its agricultural tariff relief beyond December 31, and whether a bilateral deal with Washington will lift the Section 338 duties or instead impose conditions on Canada's dealings with Beijing. Until those questions are answered, North American automotive, agri-food and metals supply chains will continue to operate under a high level of policy uncertainty.
💡 Alternative Solution
Diversify exports toward ASEAN, the Philippines, Indonesia, the UAE and the European Union, negotiate a bilateral tariff deal with the United States to lift Section 338 duties, require Canadian-controlled joint ventures and local sourcing for any Chinese auto investment, introduce a screening regime for connected vehicle software and data, attract non-Chinese investors such as European automakers or defense manufacturers for idle plants like Brampton, secure a long-term extension of Chinese tariff relief on canola and agri-food, expand Pacific coast energy export capacity to reduce reliance on the US market