China Proposes Export Bans on 12 Advanced Solar Manufacturing Technologies
China has taken a new step to protect its grip on the global solar industry. On Friday, October 16, 2026, the Ministry of Commerce and the Ministry of Science and Technology published a draft proposal, Joint Announcement No. 48 of 2026, that would add 12 photovoltaic technologies to the national Catalogue of Technologies Prohibited or Restricted from Export. The solar provisions are part of a wider overhaul covering 40 technologies, which also targets artificial intelligence and biomedicine.
Beijing justified the move on national security grounds. According to the Commerce Ministry, solar technologies are now increasingly used in sensitive fields such as aerospace and national defense, which calls for stronger oversight. The ministry stated that the goal is to prevent sensitive know-how from spreading without control, while still allowing normal scientific cooperation with foreign partners. It also insisted that the measures are not aimed at any specific country, region or company.
The draft splits the solar technologies into two categories. The first category covers outright export bans. It targets the production processes and equipment designs used to make perovskite-silicon tandem cells built on wafers of at least 182 mm with conversion efficiencies of 30% or more. Perovskite is an emerging material that promises much higher efficiency than conventional silicon, and tandem cells stack perovskite on top of silicon to capture a wider part of the sunlight spectrum. Large-area perovskite modules of at least one square meter would also be covered, as well as industrial coating processes used to deposit perovskite layers at large scale.
The ban list goes further upstream in the supply chain. It includes large-scale fluidized-bed processes used to produce polysilicon, the purified silicon that forms the base material of nearly all solar panels, along with the methods used to manufacture ultra-thin silicon wafers of 70 micrometers or less. Some advanced techniques used to improve the performance of thin crystalline-silicon cells would also be prohibited from export.
The second category does not ban exports but requires government approval and a license before any transfer abroad. It covers engineering know-how for large polysilicon plants with annual capacities of at least 30,000 metric tons, advanced crystal-growing and wafer-cutting processes, and high-performance manufacturing methods for the three cell technologies that dominate today's market and its near future: TOPCon, back-contact (BC) cells and heterojunction (HJT) cells. Some of the HJT provisions specifically mention cells tested under space conditions, which reflects the growing interest in solar power for satellites.
Finished solar cells and panels are not affected. Beijing clarified that products manufactured with the controlled technologies, as well as technologies below the listed thresholds, fall outside the scope of the draft. Chinese modules will therefore keep flowing to international markets. What is at stake is the transfer of manufacturing capability itself: technology licensing, the installation and commissioning of production lines abroad, the export of key equipment and on-site technical support by Chinese engineers.
While the bans and licensing rules are not yet in force, one part of the framework already applies. Since October 16, 2026, companies must register any planned export of the listed technologies, including qualifying key equipment, through the Commerce Ministry's online technology trade system before the transfer takes place. This interim requirement covers intellectual property transfers, overseas licensing, changes of ownership or control involving foreign entities, and deals that are already underway but not yet completed. It will remain in place until the revised catalogue formally takes effect.
The public consultation opened on October 16 and runs until November 15, 2026. After that date, the authorities are expected to finalize the list, possibly with adjustments based on feedback from the industry. The ministry said that companies were already consulted during the drafting phase and that the list concerns a relatively small number of technologies.
The proposal did not come as a surprise to the industry. Earlier in 2026, Chinese officials held preliminary talks with solar equipment makers about limiting sales of advanced production tools to the United States. These discussions followed reports that Tesla was seeking to buy around $2.9 billion of solar manufacturing equipment from Chinese suppliers such as Suzhou Maxwell Technologies, a leading maker of HJT production lines, as part of an effort by Tesla and SpaceX to build up to 100 GW per year of solar manufacturing capacity in the United States. Several Chinese executives have openly warned that foreign buyers were taking advantage of the downturn in China's solar sector to acquire equipment and talent.
The consequences could be significant for countries trying to reduce their dependence on Chinese solar products. China controls the vast majority of global capacity at every stage of the solar value chain, from polysilicon to wafers, cells and modules, and it is also the leading supplier of the machines that produce them. The United States, India and the European Union have all launched programs to build domestic factories, and most of these projects rely heavily on Chinese equipment and technical assistance. Industry analysts note that alternative equipment suppliers in Europe, Japan or South Korea are fewer, more expensive and often slower to deliver.
In the short term, the draft rules and the new registration step are likely to delay overseas factory projects, raise compliance costs and increase capital spending for manufacturers that planned to import Chinese production lines. Projects based on next-generation technologies such as perovskite tandem cells appear the most exposed, since this know-how would be fully banned from export. Over the longer term, the measures could slow down the efforts of foreign manufacturers to close the technology gap with Chinese leaders.
The controls could also have side effects for China itself. Chinese equipment makers rely on export orders at a time when their domestic market suffers from overcapacity and falling prices, and solar manufacturers with factories in Southeast Asia, the Middle East or the United States may face new administrative hurdles when moving technology to their own overseas plants. Observers also warn that the measures could heighten trade tensions and invite retaliation from trading partners.
As of October 18, 2026, the registration requirement is active and the industry is reviewing the draft list ahead of the November 15 deadline. Manufacturers and investors outside China are now assessing which of their projects depend on technologies covered by the catalogue, and whether their planned equipment deliveries could be blocked or delayed once the final version is adopted.
💡 Alternative Solution
Sourcing production equipment from European, Japanese and South Korean suppliers, accelerating domestic research on perovskite and tandem cell processes, securing export registrations and licenses early for ongoing projects, locking in equipment deliveries already contracted, partnering with non-Chinese technology licensors, diversifying polysilicon and wafer supply toward producers outside China, and building in-house engineering teams to reduce reliance on Chinese on-site technical support