Houthi Red Sea Shipping Attacks - Risk of Restart - 2026

Last updated: March 28, 2026

Between November 2023 and late 2025, the Houthi movement in Yemen conducted over 100 attacks against commercial and military vessels in the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb Strait, sinking four ships, seizing one, and killing at least eight seafarers. The campaign forced major shipping lines to reroute around the Cape of Good Hope, adding 10 to 14 days per voyage and raising war risk premiums by hundreds of thousands of dollars per transit. Before the attacks, the Suez Canal processed roughly 80 containerships per week. By mid-January 2026, that number had only recovered to 26. The crisis cut global seaborne trade through this corridor, which normally handles 10 to 15 percent of worldwide maritime commerce.

The Houthis suspended all maritime and missile operations in November 2025, following the Gaza ceasefire of October 10, 2025, and a separate US-Houthi ceasefire brokered by Oman in May 2025 under which the group stopped targeting American vessels in exchange for an end to US airstrikes. From approximately November 11, 2025 to late February 2026, no confirmed missile or drone attacks on merchant ships were recorded. Some major carriers, including Maersk, cautiously resumed Red Sea routes during this window, though Maersk reported a 153 million dollar loss in its Ocean division for Q4 2025 as it navigated the transition.

On February 28, 2026, the United States and Israel launched coordinated strikes against Iran, killing Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and crippling parts of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The Houthis immediately condemned the operation. Two senior Houthi officials told the Associated Press that the group planned to resume attacks on shipping and on Israel, with one stating the first strike could come "that same night." Houthi leader Abdulmalik al-Houthi delivered speeches on February 28 and March 1 expressing full solidarity with Tehran. However, he primarily called for mass demonstrations and media mobilization rather than announcing concrete military operations.

On March 1, Maersk announced it was pausing all trans-Suez sailings through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and suspending all vessel crossings in the Strait of Hormuz until further notice, rerouting ships around the Cape of Good Hope. France's CMA CGM similarly told its vessels in the Gulf to take shelter and suspended Suez Canal passages. Hapag-Lloyd followed suit. The three largest container shipping companies had effectively abandoned the Red Sea corridor within 48 hours of the Iran strikes.

For the first three weeks of the conflict, the Houthis surprised analysts by not launching any attacks, despite their vocal support for Iran. By March 7, the group had released only three official declarations, described by observers as more disciplined and subdued than their usual bellicose rhetoric. The tone suggested political and emotional support for Iran rather than practical military solidarity. On March 5, Abdulmalik al-Houthi stated that the group's "fingers are on the trigger, ready to respond at any moment should developments warrant it," but stopped short of announcing operations. On March 14, senior Houthi officials declared what they called "Hour Zero" for coordinated operations against the US and Israel, warning of a full-scale naval blockade in the Red Sea and stating that closing the Bab el-Mandeb was a "primary option."

On March 20, Mohammed al-Bukhaiti, a member of the Houthi political bureau, told Russian state media that the group was weighing all options, including blocking the Bab el-Mandeb to ships from "aggressor countries" involved in hostilities against Iran, Lebanon, Palestine, or Iraq. A Houthi military official, Abed al-Thawr, said the first step could be the official declaration of a naval blockade against the United States and Israel, with a more extreme option being total closure of the strait to ships bound for Israeli ports. The Houthi deputy information minister, Mohammed Mansour, later stated that "closing the Bab al-Mandeb strait is among our options."

On March 26, the US Department of Transportation's Maritime Administration issued an advisory warning that the Houthis could start firing on vessels in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. The Joint Maritime Information Center assessed the threat level in the strait and Gulf of Aden as moderate due to the Houthis' "hostile posture," noting the group "retains both the capability and demonstrated intent to conduct maritime attacks in the region."

On March 27, Houthi spokesman Yahya Saree issued a vague statement signaling that the rebels would join the war. On March 28, the Houthis launched their first military operation since the start of the US-Israel war on Iran, firing a barrage of ballistic missiles at what they described as "sensitive Israeli military sites" in southern Israel. The Israeli military said it intercepted one missile. Sirens went off around Beersheba and near Israel's main nuclear research center. Saree announced the attack on the group's Al Masirah television and said strikes "will continue until the declared objectives are achieved and until the aggression against all fronts of the resistance ceases."

As of March 28, no confirmed new maritime attack on commercial shipping has been independently verified since the start of the US-Iran conflict. However, the Houthis' entry into the war through the missile strike on Israel marks a decisive escalation. Analysts warn that a Houthi naval blockade of the Bab el-Mandeb would create a catastrophic "double chokepoint" scenario alongside Iran's effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz, disrupting roughly 30 percent of the world's seaborne oil and a massive share of trade between Asia and Europe.

Several factors explain the group's initial restraint before the March 28 escalation. First, the Houthis lost key military leaders in late 2025, including Zakaria Abdullah Yahya Hajar, head of their missile and drone unit, reportedly killed by US airstrikes. This likely degraded their planning and command capacity. Second, the 2025 US-Houthi ceasefire remains a consideration. Resuming attacks on American-linked shipping would risk triggering a new campaign of US strikes similar to Operation Rough Rider in March-April 2025, which killed dozens and destroyed infrastructure across seven Yemeni provinces. Third, peace negotiations with Saudi Arabia offer significant economic rewards the Houthis cannot afford to lose. The Wall Street Journal reported on March 21 that Saudi officials are actively working to keep the Houthis out of the fight. Fourth, domestic pressures, including a southern secessionist threat from the STC in Yemen, may have been diverting the group's focus from external operations. Finally, according to The Times, the Houthis were awaiting an Iranian signal to resume attacks, suggesting a degree of coordination with Tehran on timing.

The economic dimension remains central. Saudi Arabia has agreed in principle to cover civil servant salaries in Houthi-controlled areas for one year, representing approximately 1.5 billion dollars. Around 500,000 public employees in the Houthi-governed north, including teachers, healthcare workers, and administrators, have gone years without wages. Riyadh has also pledged 1.2 billion dollars in overall budget support for Yemen and recently announced an additional 346.6 million dollar package. The Houthis have insisted on receiving salary funds in foreign currency with full control over distribution, which would strengthen their position as the de facto governing authority in northwestern Yemen. Resuming maritime attacks would almost certainly freeze these financial flows, particularly given the US designation of the Houthis as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist group, which makes direct payments legally problematic.

To understand why the Houthis hold such leverage, it is necessary to examine who they are and how Yemen arrived at its current fragmented state. The Houthis, officially known as Ansar Allah ("Supporters of God"), are a politico-religious and military movement rooted in Zaydi Shia Islam. Zaydism is a branch of Shia Islam distinct from the Twelver Shiism practiced in Iran, and is often described as the closest Shia sect to Sunni Islam. Zaydi communities established themselves in northern Yemen's mountains in the 9th century and maintained political power through a succession of imams for over a thousand years. A Zaydi monarchy known as the Mutawakkilite Kingdom ruled North Yemen from 1918 until a republican coup in 1962.

The modern Houthi movement emerged in the 1990s in the Saada governorate of northwestern Yemen. It began as a Zaydi cultural and religious revival, co-founded by Hussein Badreddine al-Houthi through the Believing Youth organization in 1992. The movement initially sought to counter the growing influence of Saudi-funded Wahhabi and Salafi networks spreading into traditional Zaydi areas and to address the political and economic marginalization of northern communities by the central government. The 2003 US invasion of Iraq proved a turning point, radicalizing the movement. The Houthis adopted their signature slogan: "God is Great, Death to America, Death to Israel, Curse the Jews, Victory for Islam," modeled on rhetoric from Hezbollah in Lebanon, which became a key inspiration.

After Hussein al-Houthi was killed by government forces in 2004, his brother Abdulmalik al-Houthi took over leadership. The group fought six rounds of war against President Ali Abdullah Saleh's government between 2004 and 2010. They joined the 2011 Arab Spring protests, then allied with their former enemy Saleh to seize the capital Sanaa in September 2014 and dissolve parliament in February 2015. This triggered Saudi Arabia's military intervention in March 2015 at the head of an international coalition.

The Houthi-Iran relationship is strategic rather than doctrinal. Despite theological differences between Zaydism and Iranian Twelver Shiism, the two share common adversaries in Saudi Arabia, the United States, and Israel. Iran provided the Houthis with advanced drone and missile technology, training, and political support. Iranian officials have openly compared the movement to Hezbollah. For Tehran, the Houthis represented a low-cost way to project influence on Saudi Arabia's southern border and control the Bab el-Mandeb chokepoint connecting the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean. For the Houthis, Iranian backing provided military capabilities far beyond what a local insurgency could develop independently.

Yemen today is divided among multiple competing factions. The Houthis control the northwestern regions including Sanaa and govern over 70 percent of the country's population, roughly 21 million people.

The internationally recognized government, which opposes the Houthis, operates through the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), an eight-member body formed in April 2022 when former President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi transferred his powers. Chaired by Rashad al-Alimi and based in the southern port city of Aden, the PLC was designed to unify diverse anti-Houthi factions under one structure but has been plagued by infighting.

The Southern Transitional Council (STC), a UAE-backed separatist movement seeking to restore South Yemeni independence along pre-1990 borders, held three seats on the PLC until January 2026 when its leaders were expelled following a failed military offensive to seize the oil-rich eastern provinces of Hadramout and al-Mahra. Saudi-backed forces reversed the STC's territorial gains through airstrikes and a counteroffensive. Other notable factions include the Islah party (Yemen's main Sunni political movement), the National Resistance Forces under Tareq Saleh, and the Giants Brigades.

The maritime security situation has deteriorated sharply since the original publication of this article. What analysts described on March 14 as a "structured pause under tension" has given way to active Houthi military operations against Israel as of March 28. The Houthis retain their missile and drone infrastructure and have now demonstrated their willingness to use it. Major shipping lines have already pulled out of the Red Sea and Suez corridor. Maersk introduced an Emergency Bunker Surcharge effective March 25 to offset fuel supply disruptions and rising costs. War risk premiums, which had begun to decrease during the ceasefire period, have spiked again. The Baltic and International Maritime Council (BIMCO) has warned that vessels with any business connection to US or Israeli interests face elevated risk, and that insurance coverage for Red Sea transits may become unavailable for such ships. The UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2812 in January 2026, extending monthly reporting on Houthi maritime threats until July 2026, with Russia and China abstaining.

The situation is now at its most dangerous point since the original Red Sea crisis began in November 2023. With the Strait of Hormuz effectively closed to most Western commercial shipping and the Houthis now actively engaged in the war, the prospect of a simultaneous closure of the Bab el-Mandeb would sever the two main maritime arteries connecting the Gulf and the Indian Ocean to Europe. The USS Gerald R. Ford, which went to port in Crete earlier in the week for repairs, could be drawn into a new cycle of confrontations if redeployed to the Red Sea. Iran itself has signaled that the Bab el-Mandeb is within its strategic scope, with an anonymous Iranian military source telling the Tasnim news agency that Tehran "has both the will and the ability to create a completely credible threat" against the strait.

The coming days will be decisive. The Houthis' March 28 missile strike on Israel suggests the group has crossed the threshold from rhetoric to action. Whether this extends to renewed attacks on commercial shipping will determine the fate of global supply chains that depend on the Red Sea corridor.