⚠️ SupplyStatus

Global Supply Chain Incident Tracker

Hormuz and Red Sea Ship Attacks in July 2026 Cut Tanker Traffic by 90%

severe active military attack
📅
Published OnAugust 01, 2026
🌍
LocationKhasab, Oman
🏭
SupplierTanker operators
📦
SectorMaritime Shipping
🎯
Impacted Clientglobal
⚙️
Critical ComponentCrude oil and LNG tanker capacity
💰
Financial Impact$9,500,000,000

Attacks on merchant shipping in the Middle East reached their highest level of the year during July 2026, with at least ten commercial vessels struck across the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea. The strikes hit crude oil tankers, product tankers, an LNG carrier and a container ship, and they pushed transit volumes through the Strait of Hormuz down to levels last seen in March, shortly after the US and Israeli air campaign against Iran began on 28 February 2026. All times below are given in UTC.

The July sequence opened on 6 July. At 21:19 the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations centre logged a strike on the LNG carrier Al Rekayyat, a 113,857 dwt ship owned and managed by Qatari operator Nakilat. The master issued a mayday call reporting a drone hit on the port side above the engine room, followed by an engine room fire and heavy smoke. It was the first time an LNG carrier controlled by Qatar had been hit since the conflict started, and the vessel later waited offshore for salvage. Within the same 48 hour window the Saudi flagged crude supertanker Wedyan, operated by Bahri, and the Liberia flagged crude tanker Cyprus Prosperity were also struck. Wedyan stayed seaworthy with cargo secure and no injuries, and Cyprus Prosperity took only light damage before reaching Fujairah. On 7 July the US Navy led Joint Maritime Information Center raised the Hormuz threat level from substantial to severe.

The pattern escalated the following week. At 22:40 on 11 July the Cyprus flagged container ship GFS Galaxy, a 7,000 TEU box ship built in 2009 and managed from Dubai, was hit near its stern about 9 nautical miles east of Oman's Musandam peninsula. The impact destroyed much of the engine room, started a fire and left the ship dead in the water. The crew abandoned into a lifeboat and one Indian seafarer went missing. Iran described the strike as a warning shot at a ship using an unapproved route, while US Central Command called it an unprovoked attack and launched a third round of strikes on Iranian targets.

On 13 July two Emirati supertankers operated by ADNOC Logistics and Services were struck by cruise missiles inside Omani territorial waters while using the southern corridor designed with Oman and the International Maritime Organization to keep civilian traffic away from Iranian controlled lanes. The Mombasa B, sailing from the Zirku island terminal toward Khor Fakkan, lost one Indian crew member. The Al Bahyah caught fire off Musandam, and Oman's maritime security centre evacuated 18 of its crew while three remained missing. Eight seafarers were wounded in total, four of them seriously. Both ships suffered significant structural and fire damage. Hours later Washington reinstated a full naval blockade of Iran's coastline.

A week later the attacks moved back to the Omani coast. Based on a report timed at 22:30 on 19 July, UKMTO classified a strike on a vessel 17 nautical miles east of Dibba in the United Arab Emirates. Greek owner Dynacom Tankers confirmed that two of its ships had been hit at roughly the same moment while both were using the US facilitated southern corridor. The Malta flagged LR1 product tanker Kavomaleas, due to load refined products in the Gulf that week, took two projectiles in the engine room. The fire suppression system failed to secure the space and the master ordered an evacuation, with Omani authorities recovering the crew. The Liberia flagged VLCC Acheloos, a 306,000 dwt carrier delivered only in May 2026 and able to lift about two million barrels, was hit in its steering gear compartment and moved to anchorage for assessment. No pollution was recorded from either ship.

The Red Sea opened as a second front in the second half of the month. On 20 July the Houthi movement declared a naval blockade of Saudi Arabia, and its coordination office emailed shipping companies the same day warning that vessels were banned from loading or discharging at Saudi ports and could be targeted anywhere within reach. The declaration followed a coalition air strike on Houthi military sites in Hodeidah governorate and a strike on Sanaa airport. At 20:00 on 22 July, about 70 nautical miles southwest of Al Shuqaiq, the Saudi linked products tanker Encelia, a 109,250 dwt ship built in 2003, was hit by an unknown projectile that started a fire at its bow. All crew were reported safe and no pollution was recorded. Houthi spokesman Yahya Saree said ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and drones had been used against Encelia and against the 317,821 dwt VLCC Layla, owned by Bahri, and claimed that nearly ten other ships had turned back. The strike on Layla was never independently confirmed, and the ship had stopped broadcasting its position on 17 July. Brent crude rose about 5 percent on the news.

On 28 July the group said it had fired several ballistic missiles at the Saudi flagged chemical and products tanker NCC Ghazal, a 49,990 dwt ship built in 2014 that was last tracked at the oil port of Yanbu on 23 July. Saree said the vessel had ignored warning calls and was forced to turn back. UKMTO reported that a tanker had observed an explosion while transiting the Red Sea, with the crew safe and no environmental damage. Saudi authorities did not confirm the claim in detail.

Maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz collapsed under this pressure. Lloyd's List Intelligence counted 108 transits by ships with no Iranian connection in the week to 12 July, then 25 in the week of 13 to 19 July, a fall that erased the modest recovery seen after the June memorandum of understanding between Washington and Tehran. Inbound movements dropped from 43 to 8 vessels, against 76 in early July. Total traffic ran roughly 90 percent below the same period in 2025. The following week, from 20 to 26 July, total transits fell again to 39 from 82, a decline of about 52 percent, and daily counts stayed in single digits from 19 July onward, with only two transits recorded on 23 July. Before the war the strait handled well over 100 crossings a day.

The figures understate real movement because a growing share of shipping now sails without transmitting its position. Nearly 70 percent of observed tanker transits in the week to 19 July were made dark, up from 55 percent the previous week and 42 percent two weeks earlier. Mainstream owners have largely withdrawn from the Persian Gulf, and shadow fleet vessels have moved into compliant trades to fill the gap, including about 30 LNG carriers tracked switching into mainstream service. Second hand VLCCs (Very Large Crude Oil Carrier) are changing hands at new build prices because Gulf capable tonnage has become scarce.

The commercial cost has been severe. Hull war risk premiums for Hormuz voyages have settled near 5 percent of vessel value, with market quotes ranging between 3 and 10 percent, against roughly 0.25 percent before the war. A 100 million dollar tanker therefore carries a war risk charge of 3 to 10 million dollars per transit. Southern Red Sea rates roughly doubled after the Encelia strike, moving from about 0.3 to 0.75 percent. Saudi Arabia had been routing crude westward by pipeline to Yanbu to bypass the Gulf bottleneck, and the Houthi campaign has now put that fallback under threat. Tankers loading at Yanbu are taking lighter cargoes to reach the Suez Canal rather than risk Bab al-Mandeb. Hundreds of ships and thousands of seafarers remain stranded in or around the Gulf.

As of 1 August the situation remains unresolved. UKMTO reported two fresh incidents that morning, one tanker struck by an unknown projectile northeast of Lima in Oman with engine room damage and no injuries, and a second tanker reporting a large explosion nearby northeast of Khasab about three hours later. US Central Command stated on 31 July that the strait remains open to commercial traffic and that Iran does not control it, while Tehran has rejected an Omani proposal for shared management of the waterway and is pressing for a dominant role in any settlement. Combined Maritime Forces still assesses deliberate hostile action as highly likely, and analysts expect transit volumes to stay depressed until there is a credible political change.

💡 Alternative Solution

Routing via the expanded southern Hormuz corridor along the Omani coast, naval escort and convoy support from Combined Maritime Forces, crude exports by pipeline to Yanbu and Fujairah, additional Saudi volumes released through the Egyptian Mediterranean terminal at Sidi Kerir, Cape of Good Hope diversions for Asia to Europe cargoes, lighter loadings to reduce exposure at Bab al-Mandeb, chartering of shadow fleet tonnage for compliant barrels, silent running with AIS switched off, increased war risk cover and hardened onboard security, drawdown of strategic petroleum reserves and longer term contracting outside the Gulf

Published on August 01, 2026